

# Achieving the limits of the noisy-storage model using entanglement sampling

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- Bit commitment and the bounded quantum storage model
- Min-entropy
- Main result: bounding the min-entropy of channel outputs
- Application to BQSM

# Bit commitment

- Bit commitment: basic cryptographic primitive for two-party cryptography
- What it should do:




# Quantum bounded storage model

Assumptions needed for bit commitment:

- Complexity assumptions
- Physical assumptions (bounded storage, noisy channel, etc)
- This talk: bounded *quantum* storage

# Bounded quantum storage model (BQSM)

At some point in the protocol, all parties are assumed to have at most  $q$  qubits of storage (but unlimited classical storage).



- In the BQSM, there is a protocol to do bit commitment [DFSS05].

[Damgård, Fehr, Salvail, and Schaffner 2005]

# Previous work on the BQSM


$n$ : number of qubits sent,  $q$ : memory bound

- Damgård, Fehr, Salvail, Schaffner 2005; Damgård, Fehr, Renner, Salvail, Schaffner 2007:  $q \approx n/4$
- König, Wehner, Wullschlegel 2009:  $q \approx n/2$
- Mandayam, Wehner 2011:  $q \approx 2n/3$

This talk:  $q = n - O(\log^2 n)$ : essentially optimal

# Weak string erasure

Bit commitment can in turn be reduced to *weak string erasure* [König, Wehner, Wullschlegel 2009]:



For security, we want:

- $\mathcal{I}$  is distributed uniformly over  $[n]$  and is independent of anything Alice has.
- If Bob is dishonest, then  $\frac{1}{n} H_{\min}(X^n | B)_{\sigma} \geq \lambda$ , where  $\sigma_{X^n B}$  is the state at the end of the protocol.

# Weak string erasure

Given a protocol for weak string erasure with

$$\lambda \geq \Omega\left(\frac{\log n}{n}\right),$$

we can do bit commitment.



# Protocol for weak string erasure

Alice

Bob

$$x^n \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$$
$$\theta^n \in_R \{+, \times\}^n$$


$$\tilde{\theta}^n \in_R \{+, \times\}^n$$

$$|x^n\rangle_{\theta^n}$$

Measure


in basis

$\tilde{\theta}^n$ , get  $\tilde{x}^n$



----- Memory bound applies -----

$$\theta^n$$



Output:

$$x^n$$

Output:

$$\mathcal{I} = \{i : \theta_i = \tilde{\theta}_i\}$$

$$\tilde{x}_{\mathcal{I}}$$

# Protocol for weak string erasure


Does this protocol satisfy the security definition?

- $\mathcal{I}$  uniform and independent. Yes:  $\mathcal{I}$  only depends on the XOR of  $\theta^n$  and  $\tilde{\theta}^n \Rightarrow$  Alice has no control over it.
- We need that, for a dishonest Bob,  $\frac{1}{n} H_{\min}(X^n|B)_\sigma \geq \lambda$ .

We need our theorem to guarantee the second point.

# Min-entropy

# Min-entropy



$$H_{\min}(X) = -\log(\text{probability of guessing } X).$$

# Conditional min-entropy

- $H_{\min}(X|B) = -\log(\text{probability of guessing } X \text{ given } B)$ .
- If  $B$  is quantum, then it is the probability of guessing  $X$  after doing the optimal measurement on  $B$ .
- Let  $\rho_{XB}$  be a classical-quantum state:

$$\rho_{XB} = \sum_x p_x |x\rangle\langle x|_X \otimes \rho_B^x.$$

- We define the min-entropy as the best probability of correctly guessing  $X$  by measuring  $B$ :

$$2^{-H_{\min}(X|B)_\rho} := \sup_{\{M_B^x\}} \sum_x p_x \text{Tr}[M_B^x \rho_B^x],$$

where we optimize over POVMs  $\{M_B^x\}$ .

# Min-entropy: definition for general states

What about general states?

- Let  $\rho_{AB}$  be any quantum state.
- We define the min-entropy as the best fidelity with a maximally entangled state:

$$2^{-H_{\min}(A|B)_\rho} := \sup_{\{\mathcal{D}_{B \rightarrow A'}\}} \langle \Phi | (\mathbb{1} \otimes \mathcal{D})(\rho_{AB}) | \Phi \rangle.$$

where we optimize over CPTP maps from  $B$  to  $A'$ , and where

$$|\Phi\rangle_{AA'} := \sum_i |i\rangle_A \otimes |i\rangle_{A'}$$

# Min-entropy: definition for general states

- Note that  $|\Phi\rangle$  is not normalized.
- So:  $-\log d_A \leq H_{\min}(A|B)_\rho \leq \log d_A$ .
- If  $H_{\min}(A|B)_\rho = -\log d_A$ , then we can recover  $\Phi_{AA'}$  by acting on  $B$  alone.
- If  $H_{\min}(A|B)_\rho = \log d_A$ , then  $\rho_{AB} = \frac{\mathbb{1}_A}{d_A} \otimes \rho_B$ .

# The fine print: $H_{\min}$ vs $H_2$

As it turns out, it is easier to obtain results for the 2-entropy instead of the min-entropy:

## Definition

Given a quantum state  $\rho_{AB}$ ,

$$2^{-H_2(A|B)_\rho} := \text{Tr} \left[ \left( (\mathbb{1}_A \otimes \rho_B^{-\frac{1}{4}}) \rho_{AB} (\mathbb{1}_A \otimes \rho_B^{-\frac{1}{4}}) \right)^2 \right].$$

Big advantage: we have an explicit expression.




# The fine print: $H_{\min}$ vs $H_2$

$H_2$  is closely related to  $H_{\min}$ :

- For any  $\rho_{AB}$ ,  $H_{\min}(A|B)_\rho \leq H_2(A|B)_\rho$ .
- For any CQ  $\rho_{XB}$ ,  $H_2(X|B)_\rho \leq 2H_{\min}(X|B)_\rho$ .
- For any  $\rho_{AB}$ ,  $H_2(A|B)_\rho + \log d_A \leq 2(H_{\min}(A|B)_\rho + \log d_A)$ .
- (Much better bounds when we use *smoothing*.)

# Main result

# Bounding the 2-entropy of channel outputs




The  $A_i$ 's are of dimension  $d$ .

# Main theorem

## Theorem (Main theorem)

Let  $\mathcal{M}_{A^n \rightarrow C}$  be a CP map\* and let  $\rho_{A^n E}$  be a state. Then for any partition  $[d^2]^n = \mathfrak{S}_+ \cup \mathfrak{S}_-$  into subsets  $\mathfrak{S}_+$  and  $\mathfrak{S}_-$ , we have

$$2^{-H_2(C|E)_{\mathcal{M}(\rho)}} \leq \sum_{s \in \mathfrak{S}_+} \lambda_s 2^{-H_2(A^n|E)_\rho} + \left( \max_{s \in \mathfrak{S}_-} \lambda_s \right) d^n.$$



\*such that  $((\mathcal{M}^\dagger \circ \mathcal{M})_{A^n} \otimes \text{id}_{\bar{A}^n})(\Phi_{A^n \bar{A}^n}) = \sum_{s \in [d^2]^n} \lambda_s \Phi_s$

# Main theorem: Corollaries

By choosing some specific  $\mathcal{M}$ , we can get the following:


- Sampling  $k$  out of  $n$  subsystems
  - Yields results on random-access codes
- Measuring each subsystem in either the  $+$  or the  $\times$  basis

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# Min-entropy of measured states




# Min-entropy of measured states

## Theorem

Let  $\rho_{A^n B}$  be a state (each  $A$  is a qubit), and let  $\sigma_{X^n \Theta^n B} = \mathcal{M}_{A \rightarrow \Theta X}^{\otimes n}(\rho)$ , where  $\mathcal{M}$  measures in BB84 bases, records the result in  $X$ , and the basis chosen in  $\Theta$ . Then,

$$\frac{1}{n} H_2(X^n | B \Theta^n)_\sigma \geq \gamma \left( \frac{1}{n} H_2(A^n | B)_\rho \right) - \frac{1}{n} \log 3.$$





# Application to weak string erasure

Alice

Bob

$$x^n \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$$
$$\theta^n \in_R \{+, \times\}^n$$

$$\tilde{\theta}^n \in_R \{+, \times\}^n$$

$$|x^n\rangle_{\theta^n}$$

Measure

in basis

$\tilde{\theta}^n$ , get  $\tilde{x}^n$

----- Memory bound applies -----

$$\theta^n$$

Output:

$$x^n$$


Output:

$$\mathcal{I} = \{i : \theta_i = \tilde{\theta}_i\}$$

$$\tilde{x}_{\mathcal{I}}$$


# Protocol for weak string erasure

Consider this equivalent protocol:



# Protocol for weak string erasure

And now consider a dishonest Bob:



# Protocol for weak string erasure

We apply our theorem to  $\rho_{A^n B_Q B_C}$ :

## Theorem

Let  $h_2 = \frac{1}{n} H_2(A^n | B_Q B_C)_\rho$ , and let

$$\sigma_{X^n \Theta^n B_Q B_C} = \mathcal{M}_{A \rightarrow \Theta X}^{\otimes n}(\rho),$$

where  $\mathcal{M}$  measures in BB84 bases, records the result in  $X$ , and the basis chosen in  $\Theta$ . Then,

$$\frac{2}{n} H_{\min}(X^n | B_Q B_C \Theta^n)_\sigma \geq \frac{1}{n} H_2(X^n | B_Q B_C \Theta^n)_\sigma \geq \gamma(h_2) - \frac{1}{n} \log 3.$$

How do we bound  $h_2$ ?  $H_2(A^n | B_Q B_C) \geq -\log d_{B_Q} \geq -q$ . Hence,

$$\frac{1}{n} H_{\min}(X^n | B_Q B_C \Theta^n)_\sigma \geq \frac{1}{2} \gamma(-q/n) - \frac{1}{2n} \log 3 =: \lambda.$$

# Protocol for weak string erasure

- To get bit commitment, it enough for to require  $q$  to be at most

$$n - c \log^2 n - c \log n \log(1/\varepsilon).$$


- Since for  $q = n$  we cannot have security, this is essentially optimal.
- Previous best: security for  $q \approx 2n/3$ .
- Also works for any other model in which we get a nontrivial bound on  $H_2(A^n|B)_\rho$  (noisy memory model, etc).

Thank you

Thank you!

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